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CAVEATS 
A „developed economy‟ perspective 
Conclusions from academic research 
• not a summary of NZ government policy position 
• albeit illustrated with examples from NZ 
From an economist 
• (albeit with extensive information technology industry experience 
and a „track record‟ of challenging „established thinking‟ in 
telecommunications policy) 
• so assumes that ANY policy intervention altering the market-led 
allocation of scarce resources in the economy (e.g. in the pursuit 
of equity – however defined) necessarily invokes efficiency 
trade-offs of benefits and costs in both public and private 
dimensions 
 
OUTLINE 
New Zealand and its „Digital Divides‟ 
Summary of NZ Policy Responses 
The need for principled policy analysis 
Economics as a frame for analysis 
• three NZ case studies arising from a simple economic model 
– supply and demand 
Conclusions 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
Small  
• 4.4 million people 
Distant, isolated 
• world‟s most isolated developed economy  
• but dropping in OECD GDP per capita rankings (23rd) 
• heavily reliant upon agricultural exports, tourism 
Low population density 
• 15 per square km 
Highly urbanised 
• by some measures, e.g. World Bank 87%, Japan 67% 
• albeit comparatively low urban density 
• Auckland 316/sq km, Sydney 362; Tokyo 6703 
 
 
NEW ZEALAND (cont) 
Long history of  
• early, widespread availability of digital technologies 
• telephone (fully digital in 1995) 
•  ADSL (first commercial service January 1999; 85% of lines ADSL-capable 
by 2002; 95% from 2005) 
• universal service pricing (rural and urban line rentals equalised) 
• world-leading dial-up internet uptake, usage 
• broadband uptake per capita consistent or even higher than 
expected given low population density and GDP per capita 
• OECD rankings bb/capita 18th, GDP/capita 23rd 
But claims that many „digital divides‟ are „alive and well‟ 
• rural vs urban; socioeconomic; demographic (Maori, Polynesian) 
• and tyrannies of both scale and distance 
• RTT Wellington-Sydney 120 ms, West Coast USA 220 ms; UK 330 ms 
• cf. average US Google RTT < 80ms; world <100 ms 
 
NEW ZEALAND POLICY RESPONSES 
Government-subsidised Ultra-fast broadband network (PPPs) 
• G-PON fibre 100Mbps to 70% of NZ customers (cost NZ$1.35 
billion) by 2018; prioritising schools and businesses 
• to address perceived low (lagging?) broadband uptake and to 
enable a “step-change in economic performance” “in line with our 
competitors”  (i.e. Australia, but also likely Korea and Japan) 
Rural Broadband Initiative 
• any technology (including wireless, satellite) covering all schools 
and 252,000 households (15% of population) with minimum 5Mbps 
(cost NZ$400 million)  
• to address perceived lack of rural facilities  
e-Government policy (Government service delivery) 
 
 
 
SOME PRINCIPLED ANALYSIS OF POLICIES 
What is the „digital divide‟? 
• how do we define it? 
How do we measure it? 
• does it actually exist? 
If it does exist, can we actually do anything constructive 
to address it? 
• i.e. will policies make any difference? 
How do we know that our policies have had any effect? 
• what is the counterfactual? 
• will „divides‟ resolve themselves despite intervention? 
• is „speeding up‟ resolution worth the costs? 
• are there any negative side-effects? 
 
WHICH DIVIDE?  
Infrastructure  
• access or uptake? 
• application, appliance or network? 
Geography 
• urban vs rural 
• population density: sparse vs dense 
• degree of urbanisation 
• proximate vs distant populations 
 
 
WHOSE DIVISION? 
Demographic/Socioeconomic 
• age 
• gender 
• ethnicity  
• Income 
• disability  
Individuals, household, families or ???? 
Business or residential? 
Social or commercial? 
 
 
HOW TO MEASURE IT? 
Infrastructure/applications 
• per capita? 
• per dollar of GDP? 
• absolute rates? 
• growth rates? 
And how is „equity‟ defined? 
• equalised indicator statistics? 
• paying the same price? 
• receiving the same quality of service? 
• equivalent levels of consumer surplus? 
 
 
WHO CARES (AND WHY)? - INCENTIVES 
Government(s) 
• service push 
•  other policy objectives 
• social equity 
• enabling capture of external social benefits (distinct from private)  
• regional development 
• economic aspirations  
• international infrastructure „arms races‟ 
• a reason to regulate telcos more intensively 
• vote-farming 
Disadvantaged „communities‟ (however defined) 
• addressing real or perceived needs or inequities  
• private gains available as well as social 
• other 
• advantages in relative rivalries 
• subsidy-gathering 
 
WHO CARES (AND WHY)? (cont) 
Infrastructure and application provider firms 
• growing the market size/bringing forward deployment in 
some locations 
• lowering average fixed costs per customer 
• competing for subsidies 
• lowering shareholder risk/potential profit increases  
DO DIFFERENCES EVEN MATTER? 
Are all digital consumers (or digits) actually (or aspire to 
be) equal anyway? 
• e.g. equalised rural-urban prices advantage affluent farmers 
and managerial-class telecommuters at the same time as 
they disadvantage poor, urban blue-collar households 
• e.g. equalised access and pricing for recreational vs 
commercial activities 
Why so much emphasis on closing the „digital divide‟? 
• at the expense of allocating (scarce) policy attention and 
resources to closing other „divides‟ – e.g. food, housing, 
transport  etc. – many of which follow the same dimensions 
as the „digital divide‟ 
• the „aircon‟ divide (Fink & Kenny, 2004) 
• legacy of the (data, regulation) availability bias? 
 
 
AN ECONOMIC FRAME FOR ANALYSIS 
Competitive (or well-regulated) markets do a reasonably 
good job of supplying  infrastructure and applications 
to consumers who value them above the cost of 
production 
Starting point for analysis is models of supply and 
demand 
• if a „divide‟ is discerned, how is it explained in a supply and 
demand context? 
• knowing this, 
1. is it feasible to „close the divide‟ with a policy intervention? 
2. what are the costs/benefits available from and tradeoffs invoked by 
intervening? 
 
 
MARKET DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
Quantity 
Price/cost 
Supply = Long Run Marginal Cost 
q* 
p* 
Resource cost of producing q* 
Producers‟ surplus (rent) 
Consumer‟s surplus (rent) 
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Demand 
DIVINING DIMENSIONS OF THE DIVIDE 
„Divides in availability‟ of infrastructure/applications arise 
when the average cost of supplying a given market lies 
above the willingness to pay („demand‟) of consumers in 
that market 
• amenable to supply-side intervention (e.g. subsidised network) 
• but note other alternatives, e.g. Price Discrimination 
„Divides in uptake‟ of infrastructures/applications arise when 
the willingness to pay of some consumers falls below the 
price at which it is offered in a given market  
• amenable to (targeted) demand-side intervention 
• supply-side interventions (e.g. universal pricing) applied to „demand-side‟ 
problems are „blunt instruments‟ with potentially distortionary consequences  
Demand below Average Cost 
Good not provided or consumed 
at any price 
Subsidy lowers effective cost 
Good now provided and 
consumed at price P 
demand 
average cost 
P 
By the Q consumers valuing it 
at P or above 
Consumers valuing it below P 
will not purchase  
Q 
Consumer Surplus 
Will not purchase 
DEMAND CURVES ARE DOWNWARD-SLOPING  
PRECISELY BECAUSE INDIVIDUALS HAVE 
INHERENTLY DIFFERENT VALUATIONS FOR THE 
GOOD 
Market demand curves are the aggregate of individual 
valuations 
• individuals make the purchase choice in a constrained budget 
environment based upon their relative valuations of the private 
benefit derived from a range of available goods 
Ceteris Paribus – uptake differences amongst different 
consumer groups with different demand valuations is 
THE NORM 
• intervention indicated only if there are external (public) 
costs/benefits not taken into consideration 
 
 
CONSUMER DEMAND 
Individual Demand 
Price 
 Quantity demanded   Quantity demanded 
Market Demand 
+ + + 
preferences 
Income 
prices 
total willingness to pay 
Consumer surplus is the total willingness to pay less what is  
actually paid: it is a money measure of welfare in certain circumstances 
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total willingness to pay 
DIFFERENT DEMAND LEVELS AND 
ELASTICITIES 
“Steeper” demand curves arise because consumers have 
fewer substitutes in their product choice set 
• a large change in price has very little effect on choice to purchase  
• “flatter” demand curves => would prefer to buy something else if 
price changes even by only a little bit 
Higher valuation means greater benefit is derived 
• usually because the alternatives/substitutes that could deliver 
similar outcomes are high-priced 
• examples – alternative leisure activities; costs of communication alternatives  
 
 
 
 
$ 
Quantity 
P 
Q 
P1 
Q2 Q1 
NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY 1 – RURAL 
EMAIL (Howell, 2001) 
Business use of email 
• substitute for other more costly forms of communication 
• phone, fax, standard post (means long journey to post centre for rural 
businesses compared to urban) 
Population data – September 2000 
• „Yellow Pages‟ Business Directory (monopoly), by region 
• NZ fixed line network 100% digitised 
• email only available if a telephone connection is purchased 
• if telephone number/email address advertised (paid for) then 
being used (so has value to the business) 
• no difference in line rental rural vs urban but rural users make (and receive) 
more high-cost long-distance calls 
• ratio of email advertisers to total listings 
RESULTS: EMAIL 
Aggregate figures suggest a divide 
But disaggregated by region, many provincial and rural 
areas had a higher proportion of businesses listing 
email addresses than urban 
• more rural South Island leads more urban North Island 
• highest ranking rural area listing rate 50% higher than 
highest-ranking urban 
• (some) rural areas early adopters as substitutes more costly 
Not carried through to website listings 
• substitutes for a different set of activities 
• all businesses use post, fax but not all suited to web trading 
• infrastructure quality would have some effect in rural areas 



TWO YEARS LATER (Howell & Marriott, 2002) 
North-south divide still evident, but reducing 
• expected as technology matures 
Provincial areas consolidating the lead over urban  
NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY 2: UNIVERSAL 
SERVICE PRICING (Heatley & Howell, 2010) 
Line rentals equalised nationwide (since 1881) 
• follows historic pattern of „postalised‟ tariffs for Government-
owned monopoly Post and Telephony services 
• despite very different costs of provision 
• rural-urban 
• Auckland urban (33% of popn, density 316/sq km and highest density) and 
other NZ (Wellington – 2nd at 59/sq km; non-Auckland average 14/sq km) 
Original objectives 
• regional development („settling the interior‟) 
• equity 
Now enshrined in artefact and legislation in NZ 
• political, economic power in rural (and non-Auckland) NZ 
 
 
DIGITAL DIVIDE ASSUMPTIONS 
Rural populations disadvantaged 
• socially isolated 
• so will likely place a premium on access to social media 
• more costly to access information, information-based  resources 
• libraries, cinemas  
So, relative to rural consumers, all else held constant, they 
can be expected to place a higher valuation on an 
internet/broadband connection 
• as borne out in previous case study 
APPLYING SUPPLY AND DEMAND MODEL 
Urban cost is less than rural cost 
• assume price equals average cost, consumer surplus identical 
at each average cost 
What does applying „universal price‟ do? 
• rural quantity increases from Q to QR 
• rural consumer surplus increases 
• urban quantity decreases from Q to QU 
• urban consumer surplus decreases – now only a small 
proportion of rural surplus 
• poor, budget-constrained urban residents will not buy (even though they 
value it more than cost of provision), whilst high-valuing residents, who 
would have purchased at the high price, get a „windfall‟ surplus bonus 
Is this „fair‟? 
 
$ 
Quantity 
Urban cost 
PU 
Q 
Rural cost 
PR 
Q2 Q1 
urban demand 
rural demand 
Universal 
Price PK 
LESSONS  
Surpluses are „private gains‟ 
But what about social gains? 
Externalities associated with network effects 
• economies of scale 
Historically ameliorated by PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
• charging lower prices to lower-valuing consumers to 
increase the total number sold and reduce average cost 
• e.g. pensioner discounts 
• and will induce operators to supply in areas where 
otherwise a subsidy would be necessary  
But is prevented by regulation in most countries 
• discriminates against  competitive entrants 
• but ultimately harms end consumers? 
 
CASE STUDY 3: PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Demand below average cost  
• no supply at a single price (without subsidy) 
If high-valuing consumers (demand-inelastic) and low-
valuing (demand-elastic) consumers can be identified 
and resale prevented, then 
• sell to low-valuers at low price, high-valuers at high price 
• maximum quantity sold – lowest average cost per unit 
• if profits from selling to high-valuers compensate for losses 
on units sold to low-valuers, then network will be supplied 
without need for subisdies 
• high-valuers, low-valuers both get surplus 
• and network operator may also get profits 
 
$ 
Quantity 
demand 
Average cost 
P High 
P Low 
Cost Q 
Q QH 
profit 
loss 
PRICE DISCRIMINATION (Howell & Wallsten, forthcoming) 
Impossible in New Zealand fixed line networks 
• non-discrimination provisions in Structural Separation  
Worldwide, has likely led to intense competition in 
network speed as a proxy means to extract additional 
surplus from high-valuing consumers  
• yet evidence of most consumers placing a high premium on 
speed is sparse 
Manifest in mobile networks 
• business customer discounting widespread 
• little evidence of speed differences on one network as a 
means of attracting customers  
• all customers get „best efforts on network at time‟ broadband speed 
• no apparent interest in a „mobile digital divide‟ or policies to 
prevent  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Differences in prices and statistical artefacts are not 
necessarily evidence of real „divides‟ amenable to 
policy instruments 
• indeed, policies designed to close some observed „divides‟ 
may actually exacerbate inequalities and decrease total 
welfare 
There is no substitute for policy-makers first 
understanding the underlying multiple dimensions of 
perceived „divides‟ before imposing policies that will 
alter the status quo 
Resources for policy analysis are scarce 
• but the costs of getting policies wrong are substantial 
• it needs to be wisely spent 
• more economic analysis of digital divide policies indicated 
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